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This article provides a survey of significant developments in the area of international
transportation law during the year 2011.'
I. United States Aviation Consumer Protection Rules
Consumer protection issues remained a top priority for U.S. regulators and Congress in
2011, as the Department of Transportation (DOT) finalized its comprehensive phase two
"Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections" rule (EAPP #2) on April 25, 2011, which ex-
tended tarmac delay and customer service plan requirements to foreign air carriers, inter-
national flights, and more U.S. airports effective August 23, 2011.2 EAPP #2 contains a
* Gerald F. Murphy served as the committee editor for this article. Gerald F. Murphy is a Counsel in the
Aviation and Corporate Groups at Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C. Section I on United States
Aviation Consumer Protection Rules was written by Lorraine B. Halloway, a Partner in the Aviation and
International Trade Groups at Crowell & Moring LLP, and Gerald F. Murphy. Section I on Canadian
Airline Competition Developments was written by Catherine A. Pawluch and Lee-Ann Gibbs, a partner in
the Aviation and Competition/Antitrust Law Group, and an associate in the Competition/Antitrust Law
Group, respectively, with the Toronto office of Davis LLP. Section III on European Aviation Law was
written by Catherine Erkelens and Niki Leyes of the Aviation & Aerospace Group of Bird & Bird LLP in
Brussels. Section IV on the Uniform Intermodal Cargo Law was written by Hillary Andrews Booth, a
partner with Dongell Lawrence Finney LLP in Los Angeles, and MarkJ. Andrews, Partner-in-Charge for the
Washington, D.C. office of Dallas-based Strasburger & Price, LLP. Section V on Developments in
European Union Transport Law was written by James H. Bergeron, a Political Advisor with the NATO
Strike Force in Naples, Italy. His contribution was made in his personal capacity.
1. This article presents recent developments in the law of international transportation and was initially
designated for inclusion with other survey articles in the International Legal Develorments Year in Review: 2011,
46 Lw'r'L LAW. 1 (2012). For developments in 2010, see Mark J. Andrews, James H. Bergeron, Leendert
Creyf, & Catherine Erkelens, International Transportation Law, 45 INT'L LAW. 313 (2011). For developments
in 2009, see Mark J. Andrews, James H. Bergeron, Leendert Creyf, Catherine Erkelens, Loraine B. Halloway,
David Hernandez, Gerald F. Murphy, Catherine A. Pawluch, & Erin Spry Staton, International Transportation
Law, 44 INT'L LAW. 379 (2010).
2. Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25, 2011). As reported in last
year's Year-In-Review, the first Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections rule required, among other things,
that U.S. carriers adopt contingency plans for lengthy tarmac delays that include an assurance that a carrier
will not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac at a U.S. airport for more than three hours in the case of
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second set of provisions for which DOT has delayed implementation until January 24,
2012, and some of these provisions, including DOT's reversal of its longstanding full fare
enforcement policy (Full Fare Rule). The Full Fare Rule required that air carriers hold
reservations without payment for twenty-four hours or provide refunds to passengers who
cancel a reservation within twenty-four hours of booking (24-Hour Freeze Rule) and pro-
hibited post-payment increases (No Increase in Fees Rule), which have been the subject of
a judicial challenge brought by Allegiant Air, Spirit Airlines, and Southwest Airlines. 3 Air-
lines for America4 and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) have intervened
in support of the airline-petitioners. IATA asserts that the challenged rules violate funda-
mental principles of U.S. constitutional and administrative law, re-regulate aspects of air-
line pricing and services in violation of the Airline Deregulation Act, threaten disharmony
among national regulatory regimes, and could disrupt international air transportation. Al-
leging that certain provisions of EAPP #2 impose U.S. requirements on foreign airlines'
activities outside the United States even when those activities are not primarily directed to
customers located within the United States, IATA characterizes the new rule as an unjusti-
fied, extraterritorial application of U.S. law. IATA specifically cites the Full Fare, 24-
Hour Freeze, and No Increase in Fees Rules as exceeding DOT's jurisdictional authority
because each of them "has an impact that goes beyond the distribution of air transporta-
tion"5 in the United States, and the Full Fare Rule, in particular, as exceeding DOT's
statutory authority because it "has made no finding that existing market-driven standards
of disclosure are unfair or misleading." 6
Other consumer or disability related rulemakings in 2011 include two widely opposed
proposals to: (i) require U.S. and foreign air carriers and U.S. airports to make their web-
sites and automated kiosks more accessible to passengers with disabilities; 7 (ii) collect reve-
domestic flights and for more than a set number of hours, as determined by the carrier, for international
flights without providing passengers an opportunity to de-plane. See Andrews, supra note 2; Enhancing Air-
line Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983 (Dec. 30, 2009)).
3. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., No. 11-1219, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15189, at *2-3 (D.C.
Cir. July 24, 2012); see also Notification & Statement of Issues of Intervenor Southwest Airlines Co. (in
Support of Petitioners) at 1, Spirit Airlines, No. 11-1219, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15189.
4. The Air Transport Association of America (ATA) formally changed its name to "Airlines for America,"
effective December 1, 2011. Air Transport Association Changes Name to Airlinesfor America (A4A), ARLINES
FOR A.\. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.airlines.org/Pages/news 12-01-2011.aspx.
5. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Air Transport Association in Support of Petitioners & Intervenor
at 4, Spirit Airlines, No. 11-1219, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15189.
6. Id. at 14. In the meantime, DOT is continuing to aggressively enforce its current full-fare policy,
which permits government taxes and fees to be listed separate from the base fare in advertisements as long as
such taxes and fees are levied by a government entity, are not ad valorem in nature, are collected on a per-
passenger basis, and the existence and amounts are clearly indicated at the first point in the advertisement
where a fare is presented. See, e.g., RosA.tmD A. K .Api, U.S. DEFPT OF TRANsp., DOT-OST-2011-0003,
CONSENT ORDER 1-2 (Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-
OST-2011-0003-0062 (Spirit fined $50,000 for failing to adequately disclose in certain billboard and poster
advertisements, as well as Twitter feeds, information about additional applicable taxes and fees); ROSALIND A.
KNApV, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., DOT-OST 2011-0003 DOT,, CONSENT ORDER 1, 3 (Oct. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documnentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2011-0003-0055 (South African
Airways and ticket agent Destination Southern Africa fined $55,000 and $20,000, respectively, for failing to
adequately disclose on their websites government taxes and fees that were in addition to the advertised fare
and that certain advertised air and hotel tour prices were available only with double occupancy).
7. Non-discrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated
Kiosks at U.S. Airports, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,307 (proposed Sept. 26, 2011) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). The
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nue information from large certificated (U.S.) air carriers on nineteen categories of
ancillary fees collected from passengers, the number of checked bags, and the number of
mishandled wheelchairs and scooters;s and (iii) a less-controversial proposal to ban smok-
ing of electronic cigarettes on aircraft.9
II. Canada Airline Competition Developments
The Canadian Commissioner of Competition (Commissioner) filed a Notice of Appli-
cation (Application) to the Canadian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) pursuant to Sec-
tions 90.1 and 92 of the Competition Act (the Act) for orders prohibiting Air Canada and
United Continental Holdings, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., and Continental Airlines, Inc.
(United/Continental) (collectively the Airlines) from entering into a proposed joint ven-
ture (Proposed Merger) and prohibiting the Airlines from undertaking or implementing
activities under two agreements between the Airlines that date back to May 30, 1995 and
May 31, 1996 (the Agreements).10 Notably, approval by the U.S. DOT of these same
alliance agreements has not deterred the Commissioner from taking action against the
Airlines. r
At its core, the case brought by the Commissioner against the Airlines is about competi-
tion in the airline industry. In the pleadings, the Commissioner has asserted that the
"business activities proposed by the [Airlines], including net revenue/profit sharing and
price and capacity coordination, allow the [Airlines] to harm Canadian consumers and the
Canadian economy by removing all incentives to compete with one another" and "[i]n the
absence of an incentive to compete, regardless of what they claim, the [Airlines] will not
compete; to do otherwise would be irrational and violate their obligations to their respec-
tive shareholders." 11
The decision of the Tribunal is anticipated to have a precedent setting impact on air
carrier alliances that serve the Canada-U.S. transborder market. It also raises broader
issues with respect to industry sectors where collaboration between competitors is com-
mon and may be protected under other regulatory regimes, such as the Canada Transpor-
tation Act. It may also signal the beginning of an age of enforcement of the recent 2009
amendments to the Act.' 2 The Application is the first of its kind since the amendments
comment period in this rulemaking was extended to Jan. 9, 2012, at the request of ATA, IATA, and other
industry trade associations. See Notice extending comment period and clarification of proposed rules, 76 Fed.
Reg. 71,914 (Nov. 21, 2011).
8. Reporting Ancillary Airline Passenger Revenues, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234 and 241). The comment period on this proposal ended September 13, 2011,
and it remains pending.
9. Smoking of Electronic Cigarettes on Aircraft, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,008 (proposed Sept. 14, 2011) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 252).
10. Notice of Application at 1-2, Comm'r of Competition v. Air Canada, No. CT-2011-004 (Comp. Trib.
filed June 24, 2011), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2011-004 Notice%20of/o20Applica-
tion_145_6-27-2011_7637.pdf (Can.).
11. Reply of the Commissioner 3, Air Canada, No. CT-2011-004 (filed Aug. 29, 2011).
12. Section 90.1 and 92 of the Act are non-criminal provisions of the Act. Competition Act (R.S.C., 1985,
c. C-34, §§ 90.1, 92, as amended (Can.). Section 92 deals with mergers or proposed mergers that prevent or
lessen, or are likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially in a trade, industry, or profession. Id. § 92.
Section 90.1 is a new provision of the Act that deals with agreements or arrangements, whether existing or
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came into force. 13 The Commissioner has recently stated that the Bureau "will not hesi-
tate to act to promote competition in the Canadian marketplace" and that it "will hold to
account companies that take advantage of Canadians."' 14
A. THE POSITION OF THE COMMISSIOrR
The Commissioner has alleged that the orders it seeks from the Tribunal are required
to restore competition in a market that significantly affects almost every Canadian. With-
out the relief sought, passengers will pay higher prices for air travel between the United
States and Canada, and there will be fewer flight options available for such passengers.s
The Commissioner has identified the relevant market for assessing the likely effects of the
Proposed Merger and the Agreements as "direct passenger air transportation services be-
tween city pairs involving an end point in each of Canada and the U.S."16
The Commissioner has further identified nineteen transborder overlap routes where
Air Canada and either United or Continental currently compete and alleges that if the
Proposed Merger is permitted to proceed, this competition will be eliminated, and there-
fore "is likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially in direct passenger air trans-
portation services on 19 transborder routes." 17 On this basis, the Commissioner seeks an
order from the Tribunal under Section 92 of the Act to redress that harm by prohibiting
the Proposed Merger, or, in the alternative, prohibiting the Airlines from implementing
the Proposed Merger in relation to direct passenger air transportation services operated
by the Airlines on the nineteen transborder routes.1 8
The Commissioner has noted that separate and apart from the Proposed Merger, the
Airlines are parties to the Agreements that enable them to coordinate on key aspects of
competition and to exercise substantial market power on transborder routes between Ca-
nada and the United States-in particular on the nineteen transborder overlap routes.' 9
The Commissioner, relying on the competitor collaboration provisions (Section 90.1) of
the Act, has alleged that the Agreements are agreements between competitors that, collec-
tively and individually, are likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially on trans-
border routes. Essentially, the Commissioner's position is that such coordination,
particularly if implemented in totality, will lead to materially higher prices and less choice
proposed, between competitors that prevent or lessen, or are likely to prevent or lessen, competition substan-
tially in a market. Id. § 90.1.
13. Section 90.1 was enacted on March 12, 2009, but only recently came into force on March 12, 2010. To
assist firms in assessing the likelihood that a competitor collaboration will raise concerns under the civil
provisions of the Act, and, if so, whether the Commissioner would commence and inquiry in respect of the
collaboration, the Competition Bureau, an independent law enforcement agency responsible for the adminis-
tration and enforcement of the Act, published Competitor Collaboration Guidelines on December 23, 2009.
See Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, COMPETITION BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.competitionbu-
reau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03 177.htnl.
14. Melanie L. Aitken, Comm'r of Competition, Can. Competition Bureau, Keynote Speech at the Cana-
dian Bar Association 2011 Fall Conference (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/
eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03424.html.
15. Notice of Application, at 4, Air Canada, No. CT-2011-004 (filed Aug. 29, 2011).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 14-15.
19. Id. at 5.
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for passengers who wish to fly between the United States and Canada. Therefore, the
Commissioner seeks from the Tribunal an order prohibiting the Airlines from undertak-
ing or implementing pricing, inventory, or yield management coordination; pooling of
revenues, route and schedule planning; providing more information by one party to the
other party concerning current or prospective fares or seat availability than it makes avail-
able to airlines and travel agents generally under the Agreements; or, in the alternative,
prohibiting such undertaking and implementation to the extent of the nineteen trans-
border overlap routes.20
B. THE POSITION OF THE AIRLINES
Air Canada and United/Continental filed separate responses to the Application on Au-
gust 15, 2011. In its response, Air Canada claims the Commissioner's allegations are un-
founded in that the Proposed Merger and Agreements do not, individually or collectively,
create or enhance the Airlines' ability to exercise market power on transborder routes or
prevent or lessen competition substantially31 Air Canada claims that the Commissioner
seeks to unwind longstanding agreements (including one of over fifteen years) between Air
Canada and the other Airlines that have brought substantial benefits to airline passengers
traveling on routes that originate in Canada and terminate in the United States and vice
versa, as well as to prevent the Proposed Merger among the Airlines, which is "intended to
and will lead to lower prices and further enhance flight options for transborder passen-
gers, to the substantial benefit of Canadian consumers and the Canadian economy."22
Air Canada claims the Application is "fundamentally misconceived," 23 "wholly inconsis-
tent,"24 and has failed to consider: (1) Canada's international air transportation policy
known as "Blue Sky"; (2) the Canada-U.S. "Open Skies" agreements; (3) the nature of the
competitive landscape around the world; (4) the rapid growth and success of non-legacy
carriers and extensive competition among legacy and non-legacy carriers; (5) the substan-
tial gains in efficiency which have been achieved with the Agreements and will be achieved
with the Proposed Merger; (6) a favorable written advisory opinion regarding one of the
Agreements from the Commissioner fifteen years ago; (7) the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation's prior approval of these Agreements; (8) the Commissioner's recent approval of
the trans-Atlantic joint venture among Air Canada, United, Continental, and Deutsche
Lufthansa AG; (9) challenges and ongoing threats of insolvency in the airline industry;
and (10) that to give effect to the Commissioner's positions would significantly impede Air
Canada's ability to compete, would have significant adverse effects on Canadian consum-
ers and the development of Canada's hub airports, and would relegate Canada and Cana-
dian air carriers to a marginalized regional or local status in the international air
transportation world. 25
20. Id. at 14-15.
21. Response of Air Canada 14, Air Canada, No. CT-2011-004 (filed Aug. 15, 2011).
22. 1d. T 1.
23. Id. T 2.
24. Id. T 3.
25. Id.
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In addition to adopting much of Air Canada's response,2 6 United/Continental claims
that the Application is based on "fundamental misconceptions respecting the airline indus-
try and in particular the nature and effect of cooperation between airlines" 27 and that the
Commissioner mistakenly claims that the Airlines are entering into the Proposed Merger
to share revenues resulting from their reduced competition with one another, which is
"flatly wrong."28 United/Continental claims the Proposed Merger is designed to increase
demand for the Airlines' services on U.S.-Canada routes by, among other things, allowing
for the development of a more comprehensive network, increasing flight frequencies, op-
timizing schedules, and reducing prices. United/Continental claims this increased de-
mand will improve economies of density on the Airlines' networks and increase overall
profitability, all while delivering substantial benefits to consumers.29
C. THE RESPONSE OF THE COMMISSIONER TO THE AiRLNEs' POSITION
On August 29, 2011, the Commissioner filed a reply stating that the Responses of the
Airlines "materially misrepresent the purpose of the Commissioner's Application and the
relief sought therein." 30 The Commissioner stated that contrary to the Airlines' positions:
(1) the Application is consistent with, and necessary to support, the Canadian govern-
ment's "Blue Sky" policy and the Canada-U.S. "Open Skies" agreement; (2) there are no
existing competitors or "poised entrants" on transborder overlap routes that can provide
effective competition to, or constrain the exercise of market power by, the Airlines; and (3)
the so-called "gains in efficiency" that the Airlines claim will flow from the Proposed
Merger and the Agreements are, in fact, illusory, achievable without the detrimental ef-
fects of the Agreements or the Proposed Merger, and/or likely to be greater than, and
offset by, those detrimental effects. 31
In addition, the Commissioner asserted that the Airlines are unable to defend the anti-
competitive impacts of the Agreements and/or the Proposed Merger, and therefore "seek
to obscure such impacts by claiming that Air Canada is entitled to prevent or lessen com-
petition substantially in order to facilitate its ascent to 'national champion' status, not
through the beneficial aspects of competition, but through an anti-competitive exercise of
market power that will be funded by Canadian consumers and the Canadian economy." 32
D. SuMMARY
The decision of the Tribunal is expected to have a precedent setting impact on the
airline industry in Canada. Whether the Tribunal will be moved by Air Canada's asser-
tions of ongoing threats of insolvency in the airline industry and, on that basis, deny the
Commissioner's requests-particularly in light of the voluntary filing for Chapter 11
26. Response of United Continental Holdings Inc., United Airlines Inc., and Continental Airlines Inc. ' 8,
Air Canada, No. CT-2011-004 (filed Aug. 15, 2011).
27. Id. 2.
28. Id. 1 3.
29. Id.
30. Reply of the Commissioner 1, Air Canada, No. CT-2011-004 (filed Aug. 29, 2011).
31. Id.
32. Id. T 26.
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bankruptcy reorganization involving American Airlines33-will be of interest. The Com-
missioner's case also raises broader issues with respect to other industry sectors where
collaboration between competitors is common and may be protected under other regula-
tory regimes, such as the Canada Transportation Act. A date for the hearing of the case by
the Tribunal has yet to be scheduled.34
HI. European Aviation Law
A. ENVIRONMENT - EMISSION TRADING SCHEME
With regard to the greenhouse gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), the European
Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2008/101/EC with a view of bringing avia-
tion activities within the scope of ETS. 35 The ETS applies not only to aircraft operators
with an air operator certificate issued by a European Union (EU) Member State but also
to any aircraft operator operating flights into or out of an airport situated in the territory
of a EU Member State.36 A number of U.S. carriers and Airlines for America37 have
opposed the ETS before the U.K. High Court on the grounds that it violates international
law.3 8 In particular, they claim that, in so far the ETS applies on flights that take place in
part outside the EU, the EU's legislature has exceeded the bounds of State jurisdiction.
In July 2010, the U.K. High Court of Justice referred the matter to the Court ofJustice
of the European Union (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. 39 The preliminary ruling proce-
dure allows national courts to question the ECJ on the interpretation of EU law. In the
present case, the U.K. High Court of Justice asked the ECJ to investigate the validity of
ETS in the light of customary international law, as well as various treaties such as the
Chicago Convention and the EU-U.S. Open Skies Agreement.
On October 6, 2011, the Advocate General delivered her opinion concluding that the
ETS infringes neither the principles of international customary law nor international trea-
ties.40 It must therefore be considered to be valid. It is by no means unusual for a state or
an international organization to take into account circumstances that occur, or have oc-
curred, outside its territorial jurisdiction (e.g., antitrust cases).4 1 The ETS can moreover
33. See Information About American's Chapter 11 Reorganization, AM. AIRLINES, http://www.aa.com/il8n/
information/restructuring.jsp?anchorLocation=DirectURL&title=restructuring (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
34. For copies of the case documents, see Case Details: CT-2011-004, COMPETITION TRIBUNAL, http://
www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CasesAffaires/CasesDetails-eng.asp?CaseID=348 (last visited Aug. 4, 2012).
35. See Council Directive 2008/101, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008
Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC).
36. Id.
37. See supra text accompanying note 4.
38. R (on the application of the Air Transp. Assoc. of Am., Inc.) v. Sec'y of State for Energy & Climate
Change, [2010] EWHC 1554 (Admin) (Eng.). The United Kingdom is the administering Member State for
several U.S. carriers.
39. Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division at 9, made on
July 22, 2010, Air Transp. Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. Sec'y of State for Energy & Climate Change, No. C-366/10,
2010 O.J. (C 260) 9 [hereinafter Reference].
40. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott IT 156-59, 225-35, Reference, supra note 39, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX 62010CC0366 (Oct. 6, 2011).
41. Id. §§156-59.
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not be considered as a charge on the arrival or departure of aircraft as per article 15 of the
Chicago Convention. 42 It is neither a tax nor a charge on fuel under article 24 of the
Chicago Convention.43
It remains to be seen whether the ECJ will follow the Advocate General's opinion when
it delivers its judgment on the issue. While the ECJ is not bound in this regard, it tends to
do so in most cases.
B. THE USE OF SECURITY SCANNERS AT EUROPEAN AIRPORTS
On November 11, 2011, the Commission adopted Commission Implementing Regula-
tion 1147/2011 (the Regulation) permitting the use of security scanners to screen air pas-
sengers. 44 Security scanners are able to detect both metallic and non-metallic items about
a person and to reduce the need for manual searches of passengers, crews, and airport
staff. Since security scanners may potentially violate fundamental rights and freedoms of
citizens, the Regulation imposed strict operational and technical conditions on their use.
Airports are not obliged to install security scanners. But, if they do decide to use them,
they will have to comply with the Regulation beginning on December 2, 2011. In particu-
lar: the Regulation requires that security scanners must not store, retain, copy, print or
retrieve images;45 the human reviewer analyzing the image must be in a separate location,
and the image shall not be linked to the screened person;46 and passengers will retain the
right to opt out of a control by scanners in favor of an alternative method of screening
(e.g., a manual search).4 7
C. AIRPORT CHARGES
With regard to airport charges, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Di-
rective 2009/12 on airport charges. Directive 2009/12 sets common principles for the
levying of airport charges at EU airports.48 Owing to political disagreement on the ques-
tion of how to finance security measures, the Commission omitted provisions on security
charges levied by airports.49 Following an investigation into the question, however, the
Commission has subsequently concluded that while aviation security is essentially a state
responsibility it need not necessarily be publicly financed.50 On May 11, 2009, the Com-
42. Id. §§ 207-12.
43. Id. §§ 225-35.
44. Commission Implementing Regulation 1147/2011, of 11 November 2011 Amending Regulation 185/
2010 Implementing the Common Basic Standards on Civil Aviation Security as Regards the Use of Security




48. See Directive 2009/12, art. 1, of the European Parliament and of the Counsil of 11 March 2009 on
Airport Charges, 2009 OJ. (L 70) 11, 12 (EU).
49. Id. 1 19. This resulted in the later regulation requiring the European Commission to report, no later
than December 31, 2008 on the principles of the financing of the costs of civil aviation security measures. See
Regulation No. 300/2008, art. 22, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on
Common Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation Security and Repealing Regulation No. 2320/2002 (EC), 2008
OJ. (L 97) 72 (EC).
50. See Report from the Commission on Financing Aviation Security, at 9, COM (2009) 30 final (Feb. 2, 2009).
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mission therefore adopted a proposal to amend Directive 2009/12.51 The Commission's
proposal is currently awaiting its first reading by the Council.
On May 17, 2011, the ECJ dismissed a request by Luxemburg to annul Directive 2009/
12. According to Luxembourg, Directive 2009/12 constitutes an infringement of the
principles of equal treatment, proportionality and subsidiarity.52 On November 24, 2011,
the Commission announced that it had requested Austria, Germany, Italy, and Luxem-
burg to comply with the rules on airport charges. Those Member States have not yet
transposed Directive 2009/12 into national law, notwithstanding that they were obliged to
do so by March 15, 2011. If the Member States concerned persist in failing to comply,
they may face infringement proceedings before the ECJ.53
IV. Uniform Intermodal Cargo Law: One Year after K-Line - Sailing
Through the Himalayas
In the landmark case of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisba Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp. (K-Line),54 the
U.S. Supreme Court abrogated the holding of Sompo Japan Insurance Co. of America v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co.55 and held that the cargo liability provisions of the Carmack Amend-
ment to the Interstate Commerce Act (Carmack)56 do not apply to the U.S. inland rail
segment of a shipment originating overseas that travels under a single through bill of
lading.5 7 In so doing, the Court acknowledged its earlier decision in Norfolk Southern R.
Co. v. Kirby,58 which had held that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) permitted
the parties to use a so-called Himalaya Clause as a means of contractually extending
COGSA cargo liability terms to cover the entire period of time that the goods are under a
carrier's responsibility, which may include the period when the goods are traveling inland.
The analysis in K-Line, however, diverged from Norfolk Southern by focusing on the nar-
row question of whether the defendant railroad was a "receiving carrier" to which Car-
mack would apply under 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a). Because the carrier initially "receiving"
this import cargo from a consignor in Japan obviously was not a railroad, let alone any
other carrier in the U.S., the Court in K-Line determined that Carmack could not apply
and that COGSA therefore would apply.
Subsequent decisions by lower courts have refined the scope and extent of the K-Line
decision. Only one month after K-Line, the Second Circuit held that the same reasoning
and result applied when the U.S. inland leg of a journey originating overseas was by truck
rather than rail. In Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance PLC v. Ocean World Lines, Inc.,59 a
51. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Aviation Security
Charges, at 3-4, COM (2009) 217 final (Nov. 5, 2009).
52. Case C-176/09, Grand Duchy of Lux. v. Parliament, 2011 E.C.R. 230 (2011).
53. Press Release, European Comm'n, Air Transport: Comm'n Requests Austria, Get., It., and Lux. to
Comply with Rules on Airport Charges (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/1 1/1410&type=HTML.
54. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2442 (2010).
55. Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of Am. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 456 F.3d 54 (2d Cit. 2006).
56. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11706 (rail carriers), 14706 (motor carriers).
57. Kawasaki, 130 S. Ct. at 2435-36. For more detail on K-Line, see this Committee's article in the Year-In-
Review issue for 2010. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 322-33.
58. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 32 (2004).
59. Royal & Sun Alliance Ins., PLC v. Ocean World Lines, Inc., 612 F.3d 138, 141-43 (2d Cit. 2010).
SUMMER 2012
750 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
through bill of lading with a Himalaya Clause was issued in Germany by an ocean freight
consolidator to a company shipping a printing press to Indiana. The consolidator ar-
ranged for successive shipping and carriage by an ocean carrier to Norfolk, Virginia, a rail
carrier to Chicago, and a trucking company to Indiana. The truck crashed into a bridge
overpass, which damaged the printing press.
On motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that the liability of all de-
fendants was limited by COGSA. On appeal, the Second Circuit followed the Supreme
Court's lead in K-Line by focusing on the location and identity of the receiving carrier.
The appeals court looked at the language of 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1) relating to the Car-
mack liability of motor carriers and concluded that the first two sentences are substantially
the same as the corresponding rail language of 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a), thus making the
policy analysis and statutory interpretation conducted in K-Line equally applicable to mo-
tor carriers.60 Therefore, because the initial "receiving" carrier obtained the printing
press from a consignor outside of the United States, Carmack could not apply, and all
three defendants were able to enforce the $500 per package limitation of liability found in
COGSA.
The Second Circuit provided further clarification of the application of COGSA to the
U.S. inland portions of an import cargo movement in Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Evergreen Marine Corp.61 There, the damage to cargo occurred during the rail portion of a
journey from Japan to North Carolina. One of the differences between that case and K-
Line was the fact that the railroad performed under a standing contract that it had previ-
ously entered into with an ocean carrier. The shipper's subrogee argued that the standing
contract was a separate bill of lading, and thus, Carmack applied to the railroad. The
Second Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the existence of the standing contract
was a "distinction without a difference" and, that because the railroad was a subcontractor
of the ocean carrier, COGSA applied. 62
One recent decision significantly limits K-Line by holding that COGSA did not apply to
a U.S.-rail carrier that transported cargo to a port as part of an export journey, even
though that portion of the journey was covered by a through bill of lading issued by the
ocean carrier. In American Home Assurance Co. v. Panalpina, Inc.,63 the exporter engaged a
freight forwarder to arrange for the transport of forklifts from Indiana and Ohio to Aus-
tralia. The forwarder retained a motor carrier to transport the forklifts from origin to the
railroad in Illinois. The forwarder also contracted with an ocean carrier to arrange the
transport from Illinois to Australia. The railroad was retained by the ocean carrier, not
the forwarder. The ocean carrier issued a through bill of lading with a Himalaya Clause,
and the railroad did not issue shipping documents at all. The cargo was on a train that
derailed.
The railroad's motion for summary judgment sought a determination that COGSA ap-
plied to the entire journey covered by the through bill of lading, thus limiting the rail-
road's liability to $500 per package. Although recognizing that Himalaya Clauses
60. Id. at 145-46.
61. Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. Co. v. Evergreen Marine Corp., 621 F.3d 215, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).
62. Id. at 219.
63. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 07 CV 10947 (BSJ), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16677, at
-2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011).
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generally extend contractual protections inland, the court relied primarily on K-Line and
determined that because BNSF was a "receiving rail carrier" under 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a),
Carmack, and not COGSA, applied.64 The fact that BNSF did not issue a bill of ladirg or
other shipping document was found to be irrelevant to the issue of what law applied.
In making this determination, the court in American Home did not address the fact that
the motor carrier was the first carrier to receive the forklifts. The forklifts were delivered
to the railroad by a motor carrier under its own bill of lading, not under the ocean car-
rier's bill. The court apparently concluded that because the freight forwarder had re-
tained a motor carrier separately from the ocean carrier, the truck portion of the journey
was somehow a separate journey. But because the shipper had retained the freight for-
warder to arrange for the entire journey, the railroad logically could have been found to be
a delivering, and not a receiving, carrier.
Moreover, the result in American Home might have been different if that court had
placed more reliance on the broader and more practical analysis found in Norfolk Southern,
and less on the narrow and literal approach found in K-Line. In Norfolk Southern, the
Supreme Court had emphasized the values of consistency and facilitation of maritime
commerce as guideposts in deciding whether a contract was governed by maritime laws
such as COGSA. The Court had "vindicate[d] that interest by focusing [its] inquiry on
whether the principal objective of a contract is maritime commerce. "65 If this approach
were applied in American Home, the significant facts would be that the U.S. exporter hired
a freight forwarder to arrange the entire journey from origin to Australia; that the forklifts
were containerized at the origin of the journey, before they were trucked to the railroad;
and that most of the journey (measured by miles) was to be by sea. Thus, the entire
journey would be considered maritime commerce. Under the Norfolk Southern com-
merce-based analysis, there is no logical distinction between a shipment that starts abroad
and one that ends abroad. From the standpoint of carriers servicing global supply chains,
the uniformity of the Norfolk Southern approach would be far preferable to the narrower
(though not insignificant) benefits flowing thus far from K-Line and its progeny.
V. Developments in European Union Transport Law
A. TRANS-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORK
The major policy EU policy initiatives for 2011 in the field of transport was the further
development of a Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and setting out a vision
for the long term future development of a Single Transport Area. Following consultations
with Transport Ministers in February 2011,66 the Commission adopted a proposal to es-
tablish a TEN-T on October 19, 2011 designed to reduce delays, upgrade infrastructure,
enhance environmental protection, and streamline cross border and inter-modal trans-
64. Id. at *12-14.
65. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 25 (2004).
66. See Press Release, European Comm'n, EU Transport Ministers Discuss the Future of the Trans-Euro-
pean Trans. Network (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/
11/137&format=HTML&aged= I &language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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port.67 European Transport Commissioner Vice-President Siim Kallas cited a lack of vital
transport connection holding back European economic development, including the use of
seven different rail gauge sizes across the EU and limits on connections between major
ports, airports, and the rail network. The new policy establishes the goal of a core Euro-
pean transport network to be established by 2030 and a focus of future EU transport
funding towards the development of that core network.68
It is expected that the core TEN-T network would be served by a network of support-
ing routes largely financed by EU Member States with some limited EU funding possibili-
ties. This approach signals a shift from the long-standing development of peripheral road
and rail networks using Euro-funding with a new emphasis on core Europe. It is esti-
mated that _31.7 billion will be provided to stimulate national investment in the support-
ing links. The Commission expects that every -1 million provided by the EU will be
matched by -5 million from the Member States and _20 million from the private sector.
That appears optimistic in the current economic climate. It is notable that, at the Febru-
ary 8, 2011 Transport Ministers meeting on TEN-T, it was stated that private financing
could be not be a systemic solution or alternative for national or EU level public
financing.69
In parallel with its TEN-T vision for 2030, the Commission has also adopted a longer-
term Transport 2050 Roadmap to a Single Transport Area in March 2011. The Roadmap
consists of forty initiatives covering the next decade to build a more competitive and effi-
cient pan-European transport system. The system is intended to increase mobility, en-
hance economic growth, dramatically reduce Europe's dependence on imported oil, and
reduce carbon emission due to transport some sixty percent by 2050.70 Other goals in-
clude the abolition of gasoline-powered automobiles in cities, a forty percent cut in ship-
ping emissions, a forty percent sustainable employment of low carbon aviation fuels, and a
fifty percent shift from road to rail or maritime transport for medium distance inter-city
travel.71 With the EU currently suffering the worst financial crisis in its history, both of
these projects appear to be aspirational.
B. RoAD AND RAIL
On December 16, 2010, the Commission adopted Regulation 1213/2010 establishing
rules for linking national electronic registers of road transport undertakings. This Euro-
pean Registers of Road Transport Undertakings (ERRU) is expected to be functioning by
January 1, 2013. The ERRU is intended to create fairer conditions of competition in the
road transport market and to allow national authorities to better monitor the regulatory
compliance of trans-European road haulage firms. Firms that do not supply the required
information will face sanctions in their Member State of registration. This is designed to
67. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Connecting Europe: The New EU Core Transp. Network (Oct.




70. Commission White Paper on Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area -Towards a Competitive & Re-
source Efficient Transport System, at 9-10, COM (2011) 144 final (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0144:FIN:EN:PDF.
71. Id.
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create fairer competition conditions in the road transport market (in effect, to level the
costs between firms and states that enforce higher, more costly standards and others that
do not). The set-up of the national registers and their interconnection are required under
the legislation on the access to the profession of road transport undertakings Regulation
(EC) No 1071/2009.72
The Commission has undertaken a number of infringement proceedings in the area of
road and rail transport. On September 29, 2011, the Commission commenced an en-
forcement action against France and the United Kingdom for failing to open the market
for rail services in the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link under the Commission's first railway
package. An open market in rail services is to be achieved by ensuring the independence
of the infrastructure manager, non-discriminatory track access charging, and the setting
up of an independent regulator to remedy competition problems in the rail sector. Mem-
ber States were required to implement these directives by March 15, 2003, but numerous
examples of state failure to implement are current-letters of notice of failure to imple-
ment were sent to twenty-four Member States in 2008. The Commission has raised with
France and United Kingdom issues of the lack of independence of the rail infrastructure
manager of the Channel Fixed Link, insufficient implementation of rail access charging
provisions, an independent regulatory body, and capacity allocation. 73
On November 24, 2011, the Commission commenced action against Germany for fail-
ure to implement common rules on interoperability of European railways as required by
Directives 2008/57/EC and 2009/13 1/EC and for failing to implement an amendment to
the Railway Safety Directive 2008/11 O/EC relating to certification of maintenance agents
for freight wagons that was adopted by the Commission on May 10, 2011.74 Of note, the
Commission intends to exercise its Lisbon Treaty powers to request that the ECJ impose a
daily penalty payment on Germany until implementation of the national measures, not-
withstanding the infringement is a delay in implementation that is planned by the German
government for May 2012 (the Commission has urged action to implement in 2010 and
2011). In doing so, the Commission is sending a strong message that implementation
deadlines are to be respected.75
C. MARrTIME
In the maritime area, the Commission focused on ensuring implementation of the
sweeping ERIKA II package of maritime safety and security reforms enacted in 2009,
many provisions of which were due for implementation on January 1, 2011. Several of
these, described in the enforcement actions below, are both costly and politically sensitive.
72. Id.
73. Commission Regulation 1213/2010, of 16 December 2010 Establishing Common Rules Concerning
the Interconnection of National Electronic Registers on Road Transport Undertakings, 2010 Oj. (L 335) 21
(EU).
74. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Rail Transport: Comm'n Launches Infringement Proceedings
Against France & the UK over Channel Tunnel (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/1 1/1099&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
75. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Rail Transport: Comm'n Refers Ger. to the Court of Justice
over Interoperability (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refererice=
IP/1 1/1402 &format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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On May 19, 2011, the Commission delivered a reasoned opinion to Belgium, Cyprus,
Estonia, France, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom to implement the new port
state control regime to comply with EU law. This sets in motion a two-month period for
Member States to inform the Commission of the measures taken to ensure full compli-
ance. The new port state control rules require more frequent inspection of ships deter-
mined to pose a higher risk to safety and an extension of the ban on substandard shipping.
Cyprus, Estonia, and Portugal had failed to notify the Commission of measures taken to
implement the port state control directive, while Belgium, France, Poland, and the United
Kingdom had notified only partial implementation measures. By contrast, on October 27,
2011, the Commission ceased infringement proceedings against Sweden for complying
with port state control requirements in the port of Malmo. 76 Under the new regime, the
target for ship inspection is raised from 25% of foreign ships calling at each Member
State's ports to a collective target of 100% of ships calling at all EU ports with high-risk
ships inspected every six months, average-risk ships every twelve months and low-risk
ships every three years. The Commission has concerns with integrity of the safety net,
but also with the impact on competition should some states establish a more lax inspection
standard. 77
The Commission has also acted to push the development of maritime vessel traffic
management. On June 16, 2011, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Belgium,
Estonia, France, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Finland, and the United Kingdom
to adopt national legislation implementing Directive 2009/17/EC, which established a
vessel traffic monitoring and information system. The Directive requires greater capabil-
ity of Member States to assist ships in distress and defines a legal framework on refuge
zones for stricken shipping-a controversial issue. It also requires connection of all Mem-
ber States to the SafeSeaNet, a data exchange network to monitor the movements of dan-
gerous or potentially polluting cargo on ships sailing in EU waters.78
Finally, on November 14, 2011, the European Commission sent reasoned opinions to
Austria, Greece, Poland, and the United Kingdom for their failure inform the Commis-
sion on the status of implementation of Directive 2009/18/EC on the investigation of
accidents at sea. The Directive establishes basic principles governing maritime accident
investigations. The due date for implementation was June 17, 2011. The key element of
the new rules is the establishment of a new independent safety investigation after serious
accidents at sea that would be separate from criminal investigations. 79
76. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Maritime Security: The Comn'n Welcomes the Review of Port
Sec. Assessment & the Adoption of a Sec. Plan for the Port of Maim6 (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http:/
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do.reference=IP/1 1/1296&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en.
77. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Maritime Safety: Comm'n Requests Seven Member States to
Comply with New EU Port State Control Regime (May 19, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/1 1/589&type=HTML.
78. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Maritime Safety: Comm'n Requests Nine Member States to
Comply with New EU Port State Control Regime (June 16, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/1 1/712 &format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
79. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Maritime Safety: Comm'n Sends Reasoned Opinion to Four
Member States (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/l 1/
1411 &format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLnguage=EN.
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D. PiRAcy
Piracy continued to expand as a maritime security threat in 2011, with the number of
attacks at an all-time high, although the number of successful hijackings has been substan-
tially less than in 2010. Ransoms are believed to have hit record levels; there has been
more use of violence by pirates, including the tragic killing of four Americans onboard the
SV Quest on February 22, 2011. There has also been a greater willingness of naval forces
to take military action to free pirated ships so long as the crew is secured in the vessels'
citadel. Best Management Practices have become widely adopted by vessels transiting the
Gulf of Aden. 2011 also witnessed a substantial tilt towards the acceptance of private
armed security guards on board vessels transiting high-risk areas.
The radius of pirate action increased to 1300 nautical miles in 2010, spanning an area
from the Gulf of Aden, east into the Arabian Gulf and the West Indian Ocean, and south
to Madagascar and the Seychelles. 2010 saw 445 global attacks from pirates and armed
robbers at sea, of which 196 occurred in the first six months, and 100 of these were by
Somali pirates. In the first six months of 2011, 266 total attacks had occurred, of which
163 were by Somali pirates. In October, the International Maritime Bureau reported on
the first nine months of 2011, citing 199 attacks off the Horn of Africa compared with 126
for the corresponding period of 2010. By contrast, twenty-four vessels were hijacked by
Somali pirates, down from thirty-five in 2010, reflecting a drop in the pirate success rate
from twenty-eight percent to twelve percent for the first nine months of 2011.
This intensification of attacks, but substantial lowering of the success rate, is attributed
to much greater implementation of Best Management Practices, the increased presence of
armed security on board ships and to the effective action of naval forces providing protec-
tion to transiting vessels. In a worrying development in the Gulf of Guinea, nineteen
attacks occurred off Benin in the first nine months of 2011, up from zero in 2010. Eight
tankers were hijacked. The piracy dynamic is very different in the Gulf of Guinea, how-
ever, with the captured vessels typically taken into port, emptied of its cargo of oil, and
then allowed to sail on without payment of ransom.
There are indications that Somali pirates are adapting a mass attack or "wolf pack"
tactic when attempting to hijack a high value target. On March 14, 2011, the Indian Navy
seized a mothership containing sixty-one pirates. The MV Sinar Kundus was attacked by
between thirty to fifty pirates. Most spectacularly, on August 9, 2011, shipboard security
on a merchant vessel fought off an attack by twelve skiffs with five to eight pirates each, a
total force of sixty to ninety pirates. Other unorthodox tactics witnessed in 2011 included
the transfer of crew to the pirate dhow upon seizure of the merchant vessel and a brazen
attack and theft of the MV Faircbem Bogey while pier side in Salalah, Oman, after the
security force had departed the ship.
There may be first indications that the Somali piracy phenomenon has peaked. In par-
ticular, the reduced success rate in 2011 matched by robust action by naval forces (in
particular the Indian Navy) both support this trend, as do reports that the piracy "indus-
try" is suffering from over-investment in expansive assets that have not delivered the
needed profits. Late 2011 also witnessed the first major land actions against pirate bases
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by Puntland authorities, who arrested 150 piratess 0 Whether this has an impact on pirate
operations will not be clear until well into 2012.
The global economic costs of piracy are better understood in 2011, with a major study
by Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) that placed the total distributed global economic welfare
loss from piracy at between $7 and $12 billion per year.8 1 Ransom payments were esti-
mated at $148 million average per year (with $210 million in 2010 alone, and a record
alleged $13 million for the ransom of the MV Irene in April 2011).82 But ransom is only
the tip of the iceberg in terms of costs, when compared with an estimated $460 million to
$3.2 billion in insurance premiums, $2.4 to $3.0 billion losses due to the re-routing of
ships around the Cape, $363 million to $2.5 billion for security equipment and guards,
$2.0 billion in the cost of naval forces conducting counter-piracy operations, $31 million
for prosecutions, $19.5 million for the administrative costs of anti-piracy organizations,
and a $1.25 billion cost to regional economies. 83 Of note, OBP believes that without
naval protection, approximately 30 percent of global merchant shipping would bypass the
Horn and Africa and take the long route around the Cape (it is estimated that 10 percent
already do as a result of the piracy situation). That would equate to a global welfare loss of
$30 billion per year.84 The investment of $2.0 billion in naval protection thus seems to
have a very good business case.
The pressure of piracy led to dramatic shifts in the insurance regime in the regions that
were not captured in the OBP study. In December 2010, after a bad year for attacks off
the west coast of India, the Lloyds Joint War Risk Committee expanded the High Risk
Area to seventy-eight degrees East, more than doubling the size of the zone. As a result,
insurance rates for West Indian commercial shipping escalated, reportedly as much as 300
times its previous levels for some vessels. 85 Vessels that had typically purchased a three-
day cover to steam through the old High Risk Area required a ten-day cover to traverse
the expanded area. India has vigorously combated piracy in the Western Indian Ocean in
2011 and is negotiating with Lloyds to reduce the High Risk Area.86
The question of armed security guards on merchant vessels has divided both the mari-
time and the legal community for years. In 2011, the balance of the argument seemed to
tilt decisively towards recognition of the value of armed security in high-risk areas. On
May 20, 2011, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued guidance for the
80. See Pirates Beware: Puntland is Coming for You, SOM. REPORT (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.somaliareport.
com/index.php/post/1912.
81. See Anna Bowden et al., The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 2 (Oceans Beyond Piracy, One Earth
Future Found., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/documents/The-
EconomicCost._of Piracy-Full-Report.pdf.
82. See Apostolos Belokas, Alarming Trends in Somalia Piracy Front, SAFETY4SEA (Apr. 20, 2011), http://
www.safety4sea.com/analysis/l/20/alarming-trends-in-somalia-piracy-front-.
83. 1d.
84. Anna Bowden, Program Manager, One Earth Future Foundation, The Global Impact of Piracy, Presenta-
tion at the RUSI Future Maritime Operations Conference (July 6, 2011).
85. See Andrew McAskill & Karthikeyan Sundaram, India Fights Lloyd's Expanding Piracy Zone After 300-
Fold Insurance Jump, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2011 9:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-03/
india-fights-lloyd-s-expanding-piracy-zone-after-300-fold-insurance-jump.html.
86. Id. There were twenty-seven attacks and seventeen hijacks off Western India in 2010, compared with
twelve attacks and one hijacking as of June 2011. See id.
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employment of armed and unarmed security on board merchant ships.8 7 Although the
IMO remains officially neutral on the issue, the issue of guidance was itself a shift in
position-as was IMO acceptance of the inclusion of discussion of armed security in Best
Management Practices Version 4 (BMP4) that was supported by NATO, EU Operation
Atalanta, and the U.S. Coalition Operation Task Force-151. 88 On October 30, 2011, the
United Kingdom announced its intention to alter a long standing prohibition and to li-
cense armed security on ships flying the Red Ensign in high-risk areas.89 On November
4, 2011, the U.S. State Department began concerted diplomacy to encourage the use of
armed security. 90 Of course, the provision of private security guards raises several difficult
legal and regulatory issues, but it appears that the balance tilted towards private armed
security guards in 2011.
In judicial matters, the English Court of Appeal issued an important judgment in Mans-
field AG v. Amlin Corporate Member Ltd.91 At issue was whether the theft of cargo by
pirates created an Actual Total Loss of the cargo, for which the insured could demand
payment, even where there was a strong likelihood that the vessel and cargo could eventu-
ally be recovered by the payment of ransom. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment
of the High Court that vessels or cargo held by pirates do not constitute an Actual Total
Loss in such circumstances. The Court of Appeal also rejected the argument that the
prospect of payment of ransom could not be a reasonable or legitimate means of calculat-
ing the prospect of recovery of seized goods.
On November 22, 2011, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed resolution
2020, extending by twelve months its authorizations granted under resolutions 1846
(2008) and 1851 (2008) to enter Somali territorial waters and to use all necessary means to
combat armed robbery at sea in those waters, in parallel to actions against pirates on the
high seas under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international
law. The Security Council also noted with concern escalating ransom payments and lack
of enforcement of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992) as fueling the
piracy phenomenon.92
87. See Int'l Maritime Org., Revised Interim Guidance to Sbipowners, Ship Operators and Ship Masters on the
Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in High Risk Area, MSC.l/Circ.1405/Rev.1
(Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/1405-rev-
1.pdf.
88. See WTI-ERBY SEuMANSIIIP INT'L, BMP4 - BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST SOMALIA BASED PIRACY (4th ed. Aug. 2011), available at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/marlo/Gui-
dance/BMP4 web.pdf.
89. See Somali Piracy: Armed Guards to Protect UK Ships, BBC NEws UK (Oct. 30, 2011, 3:21 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- 15510467.
90. See Robert Young Pelton, US to Promote Use ofArmed Guards on Vessels, SOM. REP. (Nov. 4, 2011), http:/
/www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/l 956; see also Andrew J. Shapiro, Asst. Sec'y, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks to the Defense Trade Advisory Group (Nov. 9, 2011), available
at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/176925.htm.
91. Mansfield AG v. Amlin Corporate Member Ltd., [20111 EWCA (Civ) 24, TJ 1-2, 75-77 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
92. See S.C. Res. 2020, %% 6, 9 U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011).
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